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Abstract
This paper investigates the role of unpaid maternity leave in providing household insur-
ance against paternal employment shocks. The main outcome is the timing of a mothers
return to work after having a child. Exploiting the US Family and Medical Leave Act, we
nd that mothers eligible for maternity leave speed up their return to work in response to a
paternal shock, with the conditional probability of being in work 49% higher than in house-
holds with no unpaid maternity leave. Further evidence is provided on the insurance role of
unpaid maternity leave through i) no signicant interaction between paid maternity leave
and the paternal shock and ii) smoothing of consumption e¤ects of the shock for households
covered by unpaid leave.
Many thanks the British Academy for funding. Thanks also to Cheti Nicoletti for invaluable
mentoring and to Andrew Pickering, Ralf Wilke, Peter Simmons, Sarah Brown, Karen Mumford,
Lynn Gambin, Rowena Gray and Laura Rojas Blanco for useful discussions.
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1 Introduction
An important policy question asks how families insure themselves against shocks to income
or employment. We know there is imperfect insurance as both consumption and child human
capital respond to unexpected changes to income.1 Since women have entered the labour
force, female labour supply has become a potential form of household insurance.2 However
despite this, insurance is imperfect and there are welfare implications to household shocks.
This paper analyses whether access to unpaid maternity leave o¤ers an insurance role
by increasing mothers responsiveness to paternal employment shocks. Whilst the benets
of maternity leave on female labour supply3 and child outcomes4 have been examined, this
paper draws upon a third benet which is as yet unstudied - the insurance role of maternity
leave. A mother who is eligible for unpaid maternity leave has a right to return to work after
the birth. If her partner loses a job around the timing of the birth, the right to work reduces
search frictions and makes it easier for her to smooth the e¤ect of the job loss.
We exploit time-state variation across US states in the implementation of unpaid mater-
nity employment protection. In the US there was no federal legislation regarding maternity
leave until the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) was introduced in 1993, which allowed
12 weeks of unpaid maternity leave.5 However, some states implemented their own version
of the policy as early as 19726. Although the FMLA is 20 years old the implications of
this paper reach beyond an analysis of the policy itself, by informing about the mechanisms
1Attanastio and Davis (1996) reject full insurance of consumption against shocks and Blundell et al.
(2008) nd only partial insurance of consumption against permanent shocks and full insurance of transitory
shocks for non-poor households. Carneiro et al. (2010) estimate human capital responses to permanent
income shocks which decline across the child life cycle and responses to transitory shocks which are at across
child age. Finally, Carneiro and Ginja (2015) argue that parental investments in child human capital are
close to being fully insured, with only small response of investments to permanent shocks and full insurance
against transitory shocks.
2See for example Blundell et al. (2016).
3 for example Waldfogel (1999), Berger and Waldfogel (2004), Ho¤erth and Curtin (2006), Lalive and
Zweimuller (2009), Lalive et al. (2014), Schönberg and Ludsteck (2014).
4see Rhum (2000), Gregg and Waldfogel (2005), Gregg et al. (2005) Baker and Mulligan (2008a, 2008b),
Liu and Skans (2010), Rasmussen (2010), Carneiro et al. (2015a), Rossin (2011), and Dustmann and Schön-
berg (2012).
5Conditions for eligibility, discussed in Section 2, include working for the employer for at least 1250 hours
in the year before birth and a rm size of at least 50.
6Waldfogel (1999) found leave to increase as a result of FMLA, Berger and Waldfogel (2004) found for
mothers working before birth, those covered by FMLA were more likely to take at least 12 weeks and Ho¤erth
and Curtin (2006) found FMLA to raise employment post childbirth but lower wages.
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households use to insure against shocks.
A di¤erence-in-di¤erence approach identies the insurance mechanism through an inter-
action of layo¤ and FMLA. The monthly labour market status of mothers and fathers is
constructed using the US Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), starting from the month
they have a child. The parents are followed up to the time that the mother shifts labour
state7, either to re-enter the labour market or to have another child. In between the birth
and the change of labour state the father may experience an exogenous shock by losing his
job.8 This is a meaningful shock as 8% of the sample experience layo¤ prior to the mother
shifting state. Using a duration model, we estimate whether mothers speed up their return
to work after birth in response to the paternal job loss and specically whether the marginal
e¤ect of layo¤ is heterogeneous by eligibility to unpaid maternity leave. In considering a
mothers decision to return to work, we control for her future fertility decisions9 using a
competing risk methodology.
We nd the conditional probability of observing a mother in work after a paternal shock
is 49% higher in households with employment protection around childbirth, relative to a
household with no paternal shock. This suggests that mothers with no maternity employment
protection are less able to use their labour supply to insure households. The results are
statistically signicant for movements into full- but not part-time work which is intuitive as
FMLA only o¤ered employment protection if mothers had worked 1250 hours in the previous
year.
To give further evidence that this responsiveness of the return to work is due to the
insurance role of unpaid leave, we repeat analysis focusing on whether mothers exposed
to a paternal shock speed up the return to work if eligible for paid maternity leave. The
intuition is that there is less nancial benet of returning to work early whilst on paid leave
and indeed, we nd no signicant interaction e¤ect of a layo¤ with eligibility to paid leave.
Finally, using data on annual food consumption, we nd that whilst a layo¤ lowers household
7the destination state of an individual (to remain at home, have a child or move to work) will be referred
to as the labour state.
8Similarly to Rhum (1991) and Stevens (1997) the job loss is recorded as exogenous if the reason was
recorded as plant closure, laid o¤ or being red.
9For example, Del Bono et al. (2012) nd fertility e¤ects of female job displacement.
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food consumption, this e¤ect is mitigated if households are covered by FMLA, evidence of
smoothing of food consumption through FMLA.
Employment protection through FMLA provides insurance for the mother from losing her
job whilst taking some time o¤ after birth. The additional insurance role studied in this paper
is insurance against paternal shocks by elimination of search frictions. A large literature
models labour market participation in the presence of search frictions (see Mortensen and
Pissarides 1999 and Mortensen 2011 for a review). Whilst classically the model consists of
two labour market states of employment or unemployment, a number of papers have added
the state of non-participation, which is distinguished from unemployment through passive
job search behaviour, see Kim (2001), Garibaldi and Wasmer (2005), Yip (2003), Pries and
Rogerson (2009) and Moon (2011). In particular, Pries and Rogerson (2009) describe labour
market frictions as a xed cost which make job search more costly and note that "Increases in
this xed cost make non-participation more attractive at the margin." (Pries and Rogerson
2009, p. 569). An increase in this xed cost is analogous to a limit in employment protection
after birth. Section 5.4 explores heterogenetiy in the insurance e¤ect of unpaid leave, by three
variables which typically proxy for search frictions - the business cycle, local labour market
conditions and maternal education..
The paper is related to a literature which has found that female labour supply as an
insurance mechanism is responsive to the level of her partners unemployment insurance
(Cullen and Gruber 2000), health insurance (Buchmueller and Valletta, 1999) and Medicaid
(Winkler, 1991). Our paper instead links the female labour supply response to a paternal
shock across eligibility to unpaid maternity leave.
The identication comes from the exogenous paternal employment shock and we show
our results are robust to two potential sources of endogeneity of the shock - predictability of
the event through past experience of layo¤ and through anticipation e¤ects.
There are important policy implications from this paper. If mothers are less able to insure
their households against paternal shocks, the welfare consequences will be felt by adults
(Black et al. 2015 nd health e¤ects in Norway) and children (see Duncan and Brooks-Gunn
1997, Carneiro and Heckman 2003, Currie 2009, Carneiro et al. 2010, Dahl and Lochner 2012
and Carneiro et al. 2015b for examples). However the other side of the coin is the evidence
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which suggests negative consequences for child development of early maternal return to work
(within the rst 12 weeks), through lowering immunizations and breast-feeding, worsening
child behavioural problems (Berger et al. 2005) and cognitive outcomes (Baum 2003a).
Moreover, combined with the evidence in the paper of no signicant movement into work in
response to the layo¤ if mothers are covered by paid leave, this suggests in an extension of
the FMLA to o¤er paid maternity leave in the rst crucial months of childhood could allow
mothers to insure household income without compromising child development.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the maternity leave legislation in the
US. Section 3 details the data and section 4 the methodology. Results are in section 5 and
section 6 assesses the insurance role of FMLA. Finally section 6 concludes.
2 Maternity Leave Legislation
Whilst the FMLA policy was implemented over 20 years ago, a debate continues to the
present day about the need for an extension to put US maternity leave policy more in line
with other OECD countries. The entitlement to weeks of leave around childbirth in the US is
currently the lowest in all OECD countries.10 US federal legislation grants mothers 12 weeks
of unpaid leave around the birth of a child but the US is the only OECD country to o¤er
no paid maternity leave. Up until 1993 there was no federal legislation regarding maternity
leave in the US at all. Despite this, some states had chosen to implement a job protected
maternity leave.11 Mothers without access to maternity employment protection could accrue
annual leave, to spend some time at home with their new child. In 1993 legislation was passed
and now employers in all states are obliged to o¤er 12 weeks of protection within a 12 month
period, albeit unpaid, to mothers under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA).12 There
are two conditions, rstly the rm must be large with at least 50 employees and secondly
the women must have accrued at least 1250 hours of employment in the past 12 months.
10See OECD Family Database.
11These states were California, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New
Jersey, Oregon, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Vermont, Washington and Wisconsin.
12The FMLA covered absenses from work for other reasons than maternity, such as the need to care for
an ill family member.
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In the states o¤ering unpaid leave prior to FMLA, the period of time for which the leave
was available varied somewhat. The details of the timing of implementation of the policy
and the period of eligibility, detailed in Appendix Table 1, show that some states were more
and some less generous than FMLA (for example California o¤ered 6 months leave). Since
1993 some states have made changes to the eligibility rules for FMLA in terms of weeks of
leave, the previous 12 month hourly requirement and the rm size13, although the timing of
these changes was outside the sample period in this paper. The most signicant departure
was in 2004, where three states have attached a pecuniary benet to the leave, California
being the rst to do this.14 Our sample period runs up to 1997, before the introduction of
state-level paid maternity leave.
In our data, rm size is not observed and the hours worked by women is recorded for
a calendar year rather than the 12 months prior to pregnancy. Our denition of FMLA
coverage is initially limited to an on-o¤ treatment. FMLA is set equal to one if children are
born on or after the month FMLA was implemented in the state15, in the period of eligibility
(predominantly 12 weeks) and if the mother worked during pregnancy. It is set equal to zero
otherwise, where we control for pre-pregnancy employment status of the mother. To take
account of the eligibility requirement to work 1250 hours in the year before birth we use
the annual data on hours to i) estimate the e¤ects of unpaid maternity leave on the female
labour supply mechanism, distinguishing between movements into part- and full-time work
(section 5.3) and ii) run a placebo test on mothers working less than 1250 hours pre-birth
(section 7.1).
3 Data and Descriptives
The main data comes from the US Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). The PSID
comprises a representative sample of households followed since 1968. Members in the house-
hold were followed annually until 1997 and then biennially until 2009. As the survey is
13See Espinola-Arrendondo and Mondal (2010) for details. Only 4 states expanded FMLA for both private
and public sector employees. These were Conneticut, Maine, Oregon and Vermont.
14Rossin-Slater et al. (2013) provide an evaluation of the extension in California.
15 including states which implemented unpaid maternity leave prior to 1993
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household based, information is collected on any descendents, creating a cross-generational
dataset. Monthly retrospective labour market status, including employment, time out of the
labour force and unemployment was available for each year between 1984-1997 and this is
our sample period. We constructed a sample of male-female pairs and follow the parents
from when the child was rst born up until the month the mother either re-enters work or
has another child. A state-change to employment or fertility is an absorbing state and no
further observations for that mother are included in the sample.
There are 2340 children in the sample and 1560 households. With the time dimension,
there are 30664 observations.
Both women and men report whether they were employed for at least part of each month
of every month of the previous year. The indicator for exogenous paternal employment is
generated from a question asking whether the respondents job changed since January in the
previous year. If it did, the reason for the change is recorded. Similarly to Rhum (1991) and
Stevens (1997) the job loss is assumed exogenous if the reason stated was from plant closure,
being laid o¤ or red.16 A potential problem with identication is that fathers red from
jobs may be non-random in the population and these are included in the involuntary job loss
variable. However according to Boisjoly et al. (1994), only 15.7% were red and the majority
were laid o¤. We create a monthly measure of exogenous job loss (layo¤), by combining this
information with monthly retrospective data on the individual being unemployed but looking
for work. The indicator for monthly layo¤ is a contemporaneous measure which takes the
value of 1 in the month of layo¤ and 0 during a month of no layo¤. In addition a measure
for previous layo¤ takes the value of 1 if the partner was laid o¤ in the 5 years prior to
childbirth and 0 otherwise.
To identify the point in time when the mother returns to work, women are dened as
being in employment if they report having a job for the entire month, having worked all
weeks, or if they missed one or more weeks but not because of a layo¤. Data on state level
maternity leave legislation was taken from Baum (2003b). In addition, a measure of working
during pregnancy takes the value of one if the mother reported working in the labour market
between one and nine months before birth.
16It is not possible to identify which of these three reasons applied to the individual job change.
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Additional data is merged at the state level onto the PSID in order to control for labour
market opportunities for women. We collect monthly state level female employment in-
formation from the Current Population Survey (CPS) Merged Outgoing Rotation Groups
(MORG), available since 1979. Employment rates of the civilian labour force aged 16 or over
are calculated for each state, stratifying by the education of the woman. Education levels
are dened as having no qualications, a high school or nally a degree (a 4 year college
degree or more).
Table 1 shows the sample statistics. The child-level sample includes families across time
from the birth of each child. 7.9% of fathers are exogenously laid o¤ from their jobs after
the birth of a child and before the mother changes state and 8.9% are laid o¤ within the rst
3 months of the child birth. On average 28% of the observations live in states with some
unpaid maternity leave legislation and 6.8% of observations are eligible for FMLA (which
means they live in a state with unpaid maternity leave, worked during pregnancy and their
child is no older than the eligibility period).17 Note that of the 8.9% of fathers laid o¤ within
the rst 3 months, 16.2% of these are treated.
15.6% of fathers have experienced layo¤ in the past, or 39.0% of fathers conditional upon
contemporaneous monthly layo¤ taking the value of 1. 41.0% of mothers report working
during pregnancy. Looking at the measures for parental socio-economic status, 23.5% of
fathers and 18.3% of mothers have a degree and the average age of fathers and mothers is
33 and 30 respectively. The average employment rate for women (stratifying by education)
is 60.5%.
Finally the table details statistics relating to the age that the mother moves labour
state18, to re-enter employment (12807 mothers with a mean of 26 months), have another
child (5181 mothers with a mean of 32 months) or never change their labour state (12676
mothers).
We observe the mother to be at home with their child or to have shifted to a destination
labour state - either employment or fertility. The destination labour states are absorbing
17Section 5.3 extends the treatment denition to include the hours worked in the previous year using
annual data.
18to avoid confusion between terminology for the state of residence and destination state (whether the
mother is at home, works or has another child), the latter will be referred to as the labour state.
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and panel a) of Table 2 reports that 72.78% of mothers enter work, 17.39 are censored and
9.83% have another child. Panel b) of Table 2 shows that in any month 93.7% of mothers
are at home with their child, 5.55% are in employment and 0.75% are in a fertility state
which means that in that month they have a child.
4 Methodology
The paper aims to identify the extent to which a mothers labour supply response to her
spouses job loss depends on the availability of unpaid maternity leave benets, using a dis-
crete time duration model.19 Specically, using a di¤erence-in-di¤erence approach the paper
asks whether mothers speed up their return to work in response to a paternal employment
shock and how maternity leave coverage a¤ects this response.
The choice of mothers to re-enter employment after childbirth is likely to be taken simul-
taneously with the choice over further fertility. We model three choices of a mother in any
time period t - to remain at home with the rst child, to have another child or to (re-)enter
the labour market conditional upon being at home in period t− 1 where t refers to the age
of the child in months. We use a competing risk model, where there exist two mutually
exclusive absorbing destination labour states j = {w, f}, where w and f denote work and
fertility. The hazard function at time t, h (t) is the sum of the hazard for destination to
labour state w and f (hw (t) and hf (t) respectively). The hazard for exit to labour state w
(f) is given by the probability of exit to w (f) in period t, given the individual remained at
home with the child up to period t−1. We refer to this below as the conditional probability.
Let yit denote the labour state of mother i for child age t months. yit takes the value of 0 if
mothers do not switch labour state and are at home with their child, 1 if they move to work
and 2 if they have another child. The state-specic hazard functions are dened as follows
hj (t) = Pr (yit = j|yit−1 = .. = yi0 = 0, xit, layoffit, FMLAit, layoffit ∗ FMLAit) ; j = {w, f}
(1)
19This section follows Dolton and van der Klaauw (1995), Jenkins (1995) and Van den Berg (2001).
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where layoff is an indicator taking the value of 1 if the father is exogenously laid
o¤ from his job and 0 otherwise. Identication comes from the assumption that layo¤ is
an unexpected shock to paternal employment and we test this assumption in Section 5.5.
FMLA is a dummy taking the value of 1 if mother is covered by maternity leave in the
month (if they live in a state with unpaid maternity leave, worked during pregnancy and
the child is no older than the eligibility period, which was predominantly 12 weeks) and 0
otherwise. The interaction between layo¤ and FMLA (denoted LF below) is of interest in
this paper, it analyses heterogeneity in the layo¤ e¤ect by eligibility to unpaid maternity
leave. x denotes the control variables.
The likelihood function for destination labour state w is then given by
Lw = hw (t)S (t− 1) =
hw (t)
1− hw (t)− hf (t)
S (t) (2)
where S (t) denotes the survivor function at period t. The likelihood function for desti-
nation labour state f
 
Lf

is dened similarly.
The data is right censored, as a mother may not return to work or have another child
during the sample period, i.e. she may remain at home with her child.20 The contribution
to the likelihood of a censored case (Lc) is simply the survivor function
Lc = S (t) =
t
Π
k=1
[1− hw (k)− hf (k)] (3)
The contribution to the likelihood function of an individual is given by
(Lw)δ
w  
Lf
δf
(Lc)1−δ
w
−δf (4)
where δj denotes the exit labour state indicator for j = {w, f}. Following Allison (1982)
we assume a logistic distribution to allow estimation of the duration model by a multinomial
logit. In this case the hazard function for exit to labour state w is
20The time of censoring, in terms of child age, di¤ers across observations because the timing of births
di¤ers across families but all families are observed only up to 1997.
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hw (t) =
exp (β′wX)
1 + exp (β′wX) + exp
 
β′fX
 (5)
where X=(xit, layoffit, Dit). The hazard function for exit to labour state f is dened
similarly. Huber-White clustered standard errors are generated at the state level, as part of
the variation in access to unpaid maternity leave that is being exploited is across states.
We are interested in the interaction between layo¤ and eligibility to FMLA.21We calculate
the marginal e¤ect of layo¤ on the conditional probability of observing the mother in labour
state j at time t for FMLA status equal to zero and one, given she was at home up to
period t − 1. The di¤erence between these conditional predicted probabilities is the e¤ect
of unpaid maternity coverage upon the responsiveness of female labour supply to a paternal
employment shock.
[Pr (yit = j|yit−1 = .. = yi0 = 0, xit, FMLAit = 1, layoffit = 1)− (6)
Pr (yit = j|yit−1 = .. = yi0 = 0, xit, FMLAit = 1, layoffit = 0)]−
[Pr (yit = j|yit−1 = .. = yi0 = 0, xit, FMLAit = 0, layoffit = 1)−
Pr (yit = j|yit−1 = .. = yi0 = 0, xit, FMLAit = 0, layoffit = 0)]
We evaluate the change in the conditional probability in equation (6) averaged across
the value of other covariates. The marginal e¤ect will give information on how a paternal
employment shock changes the conditional probability of observing a mother in a particular
state, given di¤erent maternity leave policies. However, the size of the marginal e¤ect will
fall as the unit of time in the sample becomes smaller because the probability of moving
states falls. We adopt the method of Dlugosz et al. (2014) and normalize the marginal
e¤ect by the predicted probability of being in labour state j for an average individual with
no paternal shock. This relative marginal e¤ect (RME) is the percentage change in the
conditional probability of being in labour state j when changing from no paternal shock to
21We follow Ali and Norton (2003) and do not consider the coe¢cient on the interaction between layo¤
and treatment from the multinomial logit as the relevant parameter estimate.
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a paternal employment shock.
We focus on the paternal employment shock rather than a maternal employment shock
for three reasons. The incidence of maternal layo¤ is very small (1% of mothers are ever
laid o¤ in the sample period compared to 10% of men). Second, the incidence of a maternal
shock after pregnancy is linked to the eligibility of unpaid leave, as only mothers who remain
in employment can be laid o¤. Finally the paper exploits a paternal shock at a point in time
when mothers are not earning which provides a strong incentive for mothers to return to
work. On the other hand, when a mother is laid o¤ the father is likely already in work (in
the data there are only 11 cases of both being laid o¤ simultaneously).
The control variables we think are important for maternal labour participation include
child year of birth dummies, paternal and maternal age and education and maternal year of
birth, family size, ethnicity and the state-level female education-specic employment rate.22
In addition, we include a dummy for previous paternal layo¤ to control for the fact that whilst
the rst layo¤ may be exogenous, further layo¤s may be outcomes of the rst (and therefore
not unexpected). Finally we include a dummy variable for maternal working pre-pregnancy
which indicates eligibility for FMLA.
5 Results
5.1 Graphical Results
Figure 2 presents the Kaplan-Meier empirical hazard function for rst re-entry to the labour
market, considering only the last birth observed for each women, to eliminate the possibility
of future movement out of the labour market due to childbirth. The graph distinguishes by
mothers eligible and ineligible for FMLA and the hazard functions are plotted against the
time since the father was laid o¤ exogenously. Looking rstly at the mothers ineligible for
FMLA, Figure 2 shows that the hazard rate is fairly at across the timing of the layo¤. The
pattern is noisier when considering eligible mothers, where there is a dip in the hazard three
months prior to layo¤ which then increases up to the point of layo¤.
22The latter variable is included to address a worry that paternal layo¤ is more likely in a downturn and
as such the women will nd it harder to re-enter the labour market.
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To test whether the hazard function before layo¤ is similar for the two samples (eligible
and ineligible) we run a log rank test. The null hypothesis, that there is no di¤erence in
the hazard by FMLA eligibility is tested against the alternative hypothesis that there is a
di¤erence. Taking 1-12 months before the father was laid o¤, we cannot reject the null that
the hazard function for the eligible and non-eligible are the same.23 But in the period 0-12
months after the father was laid o¤ we reject the null of the same hazard.24 This suggests
that before the shock, the trends for the treated and the control groups are not statistically
signicantly di¤erent to each other but a divergence occurred after the paternal layo¤.
The increase in the hazard leading up to the layo¤ for FMLA eligible mothers may be
noise or alternatively due to the layo¤ being predictable in the months before the event
occurred. There is no reason to think that this would be di¤erent depending upon eligibility
to FMLA . In any case, as a robustness check in Section 5.5, we redene the period of layo¤
to include the prior 3 periods and nd no signicant e¤ect of the new denition, suggesting
that mothers labour supply does not react to layo¤ prior to the event. Next a competing
risk analysis allows for more exible treatment of further fertility than restricting the graph
to the last observed birth.
5.2 Regression Results
Table 3 reports the marginal e¤ect of a paternal employment shock upon the conditional
probability of observing a mother in state j, where j = {w, f} or at home with the child.
All regressions control for dummies for previous paternal layo¤, maternal working during
pregnancy, child year of birth dummies, paternal and maternal age at birth and education,
maternal year of birth, family size, ethnicity and the state-education specic female em-
ployment rate. The coe¢cients reported in the tables are evaluated at the actual values of
other covariates and the average taken across individuals and regressions cluster at the state
level.25 Standard errors are calculated using the delta method.
Table 3 starts by reporting the baseline e¤ects of paternal layo¤ and the FMLA eligibility.
23The chi-square statistic is 2.76 and with 1 degree of freedom the critical value at 1% level is 3.38.
24The chi-square test statistic is 4.48.
25Note that analysis that clusters at the individual level does not change to the conclusions of the paper.
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The incidence of a paternal layo¤ has no signicant e¤ect on the return to work by mothers.
Hence on average there is no evidence of insurance against the shock by movement into the
labour market. We dene eligibility to FMLA to equal one for eligible mothers in states with
some maternity coverage and 0 otherwise. Mothers were only eligible for job protection if
they worked for 1250 hours in the year prior to birth (which we proxy with an indicator for
working during pregnancy) and protection lasts only for the period of eligibility, rounded to
the nearest month (for the majority of observations this was 12 weeks which is measured as
3 months in the data). Hence we set the FMLA indicator equal to zero in states with unpaid
maternity leave if either of these criteria are not met.26 Mothers with access to unpaid
maternity leave speed up their return to work relative to mothers with no employment
protection by 5.6 percentage points (101.60%). This nding may sound counter-intuitive at
rst if we expect the FMLA to allow mothers to stay at home for longer with their children.
However it is consistent with Berger and Waldfogel (2004) who found that "..women with
leave coverage are at a 40% higher risk of returning to work post-birth than mothers without
leave coverage" (p. 345).
Of interest to this paper is the di¤erence in the conditional probability from a paternal
layo¤, by FMLA eligibility. The interaction between FMLA and paternal layo¤ dened
in equation 6 allows us to analyse how the responsiveness of female labour supply after a
paternal employment shock varies with maternity leave coverage. The coverage o¤ered new
mothers employment protection around the timing of the birth and we hypothesize that it
would facilitate the insurance mechanism of female labour supply by reducing search costs
involved with returning to work. Column (1) of Table 3 reports a marginal e¤ect of paternal
layo¤ is 2.7 percentage points (49.08%) higher for mothers with employment protection
during maternity. If there were no search frictions, this coe¢cient would be insignicant. For
mothers with unpaid maternity protection, paternal layo¤ raises the conditional probability
of returning to work. We see a simultaneous decrease in the probability of mothers being
at home with their child. There is a positive but insignicant interaction e¤ect on further
fertility choices.
26Note that the subsequent section takes into account the further eligibility requirement that the mother
must have worked 1250 hours in the year before childbirth, by exploiting data on retrospective hours worked.
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Web Appendix Tables W1 reports the marginal e¤ects of the full regression results. Of the
variables statistically signicantly di¤erent to zero, working during pregnancy and maternal
education both raise (lower) the conditional probability of working (staying at home) whilst
parental age, mother year of birth and family size have the opposite e¤ect. The child year of
birth dummies (omitted) show maternal labour supply to be increasing signicantly across
the period of observation.
5.3 Part-Time and Full-Time Employment
In a model of female labour supply, Francesconi (2002) notes the need to distinguish between
full- and part-time employment, as each exhibits a di¤erent wage-experience prole and are
di¤erentially substitutable with leisure. In the data, 37% and 30% of women work full- and
part-time respectively. Table 4 estimates the role of maternity leave coverage in driving
female labour supply as an insurance mechanism, looking at women returning to part-time
work (column 1) and full-time work (column 2). In the PSID data, part- and full-time work
history is available only on an annual basis rather than monthly. In order to extend the
analysis to distinguish between part- and full-time work we must assume that mothers do
not change between the two labour states within a year.
The baseline e¤ect of paternal layo¤ is again insignicant. The baseline FMLA e¤ect
signicantly shifts mothers from staying at home towards part- and full-time employment.
Mothers with access to unpaid maternity leave have a conditional probability of being in
part- and full-time work 2.6 and 2.8 percentage points (or 89.85% and 109.35%) higher than
mothers with no leave, respectively.
Looking at the di¤erence in the e¤ect of layo¤ by FMLA eligibility, the e¤ect of a paternal
shock raises the conditional probability of returning to part-time work by 1.4 percentage
points more for FMLA eligible mothers, but the e¤ect is insignicant and it is signicantly
di¤erent to the comparable result of Table 3 column 1 at the 10% level.27 On the other hand,
the di¤erence in the e¤ect of layo¤ on the conditional probability of returning to full-time
work by eligibility to unpaid leave is statistically di¤erent to zero and instatistically di¤erent
27The t-statistic for the hypothesis of identical coe¢cients is 1.8.
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to the estimate in Table 3.28 Eligible mothers have a higher conditional probability by 1.2
percentage points, or 45.51%. We would expect a larger shift to full-time work and not
part-time work, as access to FMLA required at least 1250 hours worked in the previous 12
months so part-time workers are less likely to be eligible. Note that mothers returning to
part-time work may have been eligible for FMLA, but reduced their hours after having a
child.
In summary, we do see a signicant speed up of the return to full-time work (and an
insignicant speed up to part-time work) for mothers with access to unpaid maternity leave.
5.4 Search Frictions
This paper suggests that the mechanism for an insurance role of unpaid maternity leave is
through search frictions. Unpaid leave allows a mother to re-enter the labour market without
exerting job search e¤ort. If there were no search frictions, a mother ineligible for unpaid
leave could quickly and costlessly nd a new job when desired. This section explores possible
heterogeneity in the insurance role of FMLA, by varying levels of three variables that proxy
for search frictions. These are i) the business cycle, ii) the local labour market conditions
and iii) the level of maternal education.
Menzio and Shi (2011) nd individual movements from unemployment to employment in
the US are positively correlated with the business cycle. We dene a business cycle using log
real GDP for each quarter, between 1947-2015 from the US Bureau of Economic Analysis.29
To remove quarterly and annual trends in log real GDP, it is regressed on quarter and year
dummies and a residual predicted to proxy the quarterly business cycle uctuations. A peak
in the business cycle is dened as uctuations in the 75th percentile and above. Columns
1-2 of Table W2 shows a smaller magnitude for the interaction between FMLA and layo¤
during a peak in the business cycle, as expected. The marginal e¤ect of paternal layo¤ is 1.6
percentage points higher for FMLA eligible mothers (30.21%) compared to 2.2 percentage
points (39.72%) during a non-peak business cycle, although the di¤erence is not statistically
28The t-statistic is 1.6.
29This includes data outside of the sample period to improve the accuracy of the estimated business cycle
uctuations.
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signicant.
Motivated by a similar logic, columns 3-4 analyse heterogeneity in the insurance role
of FMLA by distinguishing between areas of high and low female unemployment, in the
local labour market. We expect search frictions to be relatively stronger in areas of high
unemployment. However the results show very similar marginal e¤ects of FMLA by layo¤
status for the high and low unemployment areas.
Finally, high educated workers face greater search frictions in the labour market. They
have a relatively higher reservation wage and the process of acquiring specic skills reduces
the number of potential employers. This heterogeneity in search frictions is reected in
the results in columns 5-6 of Table W2 which show that the magnitude of the interaction
between FMLA and layo¤ is higher for high educated mothers. Again di¤erence between
the two groups is not statistically signicant.
The sample of households with a paternal shock and unpaid maternity leave is relatively
small and therefore there is little power to detect signicant heterogeneity. Despite this
looking at the magnitudes alone, the results do show that the insurance role of unpaid
maternity leave is stronger when search frictions are greater.
5.5 Endogeneity of Paternal Layo¤
In this section we consider two potential sources of endogeneity of paternal layo¤. Firstly,
the layo¤ may be an outcome of previous separation from the labour market and therefore
predictable and secondly the employees may predict the layo¤ and therefore respond before
the event is realized.
The potential endogeneity of the paternal employment shock may cause a bias if, for
example the father has been laid o¤ in the past. Stevens (1997) notes that being laid
o¤ from work leads to future job uncertainty which can take the form of further layo¤s.
The layo¤ variable is interpreted in the paper as a shock to employment status, but for
fathers with past lay-o¤ experience it may be an outcome of a past event rather than an
exogenous change and consequently predictable by the mother. Table 5 drops from analysis
any households where the father has experienced a layo¤ in ve years leading up to the birth
thereby repeating analysis on a sample with cleaner identication.
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Before discussing the results it is useful to think about what we would expect to nd.
If the estimated insurance e¤ect of FMLA is driven by households with previous experience
of paternal layo¤ then excluding them from the sample should see a drop in the magnitude.
We nd instead no statistically signicant di¤erence in the estimates of Table 3 and 5 in
the interaction term30, suggesting that the earlier results were not biased by endogenous
paternal layo¤.
This leads to the next question of whether the rst layo¤ is really exogenous. It could
be argued that the rst layo¤ experienced is not a shock, if "bad" fathers who are laid-
o¤ live with mothers who return to work quickly after childbirth. However this is true in
all households which experience a rst layo¤ shock, irrespective of unpaid maternity leave
eligibility. But as we nd very di¤erent e¤ects of the shock by eligibility, it suggests that
this bias cannot drive our results.
We consider the second source of endogeneity in response to the evidence in Figure 2,
that the hazard for return to work after childbirth increases in the months leading up to
layo¤ for mothers eligible for FMLA. Web Appendix Table W3 redenes the denition of
layo¤ to include the three months prior to the layo¤. The intuition is that employees knew
in advance that the rm was due to close and started to react to the event before it actually
occurred. The consequence of including the additional months is that the interaction term is
no longer signicant for each of the three states and the coe¢cients are statistically di¤erent
to the respective coe¢cients in Table 331, suggesting that in fact mothers do not respond
prior to the event itself, by returning to work.
6 Maternity Leave as Insurance
The paper hypothesizes that unpaid maternity leave o¤ers insurance possibilities to house-
holds by allowing the mother to return to work in the event of a paternal shock. This section
provides further tests for the hypothesis by rstly analysing the response of the timing of
return to work to a paternal shock, di¤erentiating between those eligible or not for paid
30The t-statistic for the hypothesis test of equality coe¢cients is 0.04.
31the t-statistics are 3.07, 3.43, 6.64 for states work, home and fertility respectively.
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maternity leave. The paid leave we analyse is not a full reimbursement of wages but has
a value similar to unemployment benets. Nonetheless during a period of paid leave, the
increased income from the mother returning to work will be lower than for mothers ineli-
gible for paid leave and therefore we expect to nd a smaller insurance role of paid leave
compared to unpaid leave. Secondly the section examines the food consumption response to
a paternal shock by households eligible and non-eligible for FMLA. If the unpaid maternity
leave were acting as an insurance mechanism then we would expect to see smoothing of food
consumption against the paternal layo¤ shock, for those eligible for FMLA.
6.1 Paid Maternity Leave
The analysis so far has considered only the role of unpaid maternity leave in providing
insurance for households. However Lalive et al. (2014) highlight the importance of an
additional form of maternity leave which is cash benets and nd that time to care for
children just after birth is greatest for systems which combine the both paid and unpaid leave.
Five states in the US o¤er a form of paid maternity leave, through the Temporary Disability
Insurance (TDI).32 The states allow payment of a benet for the period when mothers
are "disabled" after childbirth, of similar value to unemployment benet (see Espinola-
Arrendondo and Mondal, 2010 for details). This period is generally thought to be around
six weeks, although will vary depending upon the health of the mother. We supplement the
analysis by evaluating the e¤ect of paid maternity leave upon the responsiveness of female
labour supply to a paternal layo¤.
We hypothesize that whilst unpaid maternity leave insures households against shocks by
speeding up the mothers return to work, paid leave o¤ers a benet payment which itself
smooths the e¤ect of a paternal shock, allowing the mother to delay her return to work. To
test this hypothesis, we dene the variable TDI to take the value of 1 in TDI states, whose
child is no older than 2 months old and 0 otherwise.
The results are displayed in Table 6. To avoid conating the e¤ect of the TDI and
FMLA policies, mothers eligible for FMLA are dropped from analysis, leaving a sample of
32These states are California, Hawaii, New Jersey, New York and Rhode Island
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29587. Similarly to the specication above, Table 6 reports the marginal e¤ects where the
other covariates are evaluated at their values and an average of the probabilities taken across
individuals. The regressions cluster at the state level.
Similarly to above, the coe¢cient layo¤ is small insignicant and the coe¢cient on the
TDI variable shows that mothers with access to TDI speed up their return to work. The
next rows reports the coe¢cient of interest, the di¤erence in the marginal e¤ect of paternal
employment shock by TDI eligibility. The parameter is equivalent to equation 6, substituting
FMLA eligibility for TDI eligibility. The marginal e¤ect of paternal layo¤ is 0.8 percentage
points (10.03%) higher in households with potential TDI eligibility but the coe¢cient is
insignicant. In addition the coe¢cient is statistically di¤erent to the comparable estimate
in Table 3.33 In this case, we nd no signicant heterogeneity in the e¤ect of layo¤ by access
to TDI.
It is true that the analysis is crude and requires better data on exactly who received the
benet and for how long. For example we can identify whether a mother lived in a state
which o¤ered TDI but we cannot tell for how many weeks the benet was received, if at
all. However, the preliminary analysis suggests that whilst on a period of paid maternity
leave, mothers in receipt of a paternal layo¤ do not speed up their return to work. We
discuss further in the conclusion that, as the early return to work has consequences for child
development, this nding suggests that mothers should have access to paid maternity leave
in early weeks in order to limit the impact of a paternal layo¤ whilst protecting child human
capital.
6.2 Food Consumption
There is a large literature estimating the extent to which households insurance themselves
against income shocks by examining the response of food consumption. A natural question to
ask is whether we observe insurance e¤ects of FMLA on food consumption. In the PSID food
expenditure is reported annually from as early as 1968 however prior to 1975 the measure
of consumption is somewhat incomplete as it refers only to annual expenditure on food at
33The t-statistic for the test of equality of coe¢cients is 4.00.
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home and we restrict analysis therefore to 1975 onwards. Useful for our analysis is that we
can distinguish food expenditure using food stamps. In the event of a paternal layo¤, the
government in the US o¤ers a form of insurance in the form of food stamps. Consequently the
measure for total food expenditure may respond less to the paternal employment shock than
the measure excluding the food stamps. We dene three measures of annual food expenditure
- total, food consumption minus food stamps and food consumption in the home. The mean
value of each measure is $4070, $3760 and $3079 respectively, reported in 2000 prices.
As the food consumption data is measured annually, we construct a measure of layo¤
which takes the value of one if the partner was laid o¤ in a particular year and 0 otherwise.
We implement the following di¤erence-in-di¤erence estimation using OLS
ln cit = β0 + β1layoffit + β2FMLAit + β3layoffit ∗ FMLAit + β4zit + εit
where ln cit denotes log annual consumption for household i in year t, layoff and FMLA
are dened as above and z denotes a set of covariates including paternal and maternal age and
education and maternal year of birth, family size, ethnicity a dummy variable for maternal
working pre-pregnancy and for previous paternal layo¤ aswell as year and child age dummy
variables.
The results are reported in Table 7. The sample includes more years of data and is larger
than in the original analysis.34 There are three columns of results, one for each consumption
measure. The sample size is larger than in the main tables, owing to additional years of data
on food consumption included in the analysis. The e¤ect of a paternal layo¤ is to reduce
annual food consumption by 3.7%, 5.5% and 5.5% for total food, household food and food
excluding stamps respectively where all three coe¢cients are statistically signicant. On
the other hand, no statistically signicant e¤ect of FMLA is found on food consumption,
as is to be expected as maternity leave eligibility should not alone drive consumption. But
importantly for the analysis, the coe¢cient β
3
suggests that the negative e¤ect of layo¤ is
removed for mothers eligible for FMLA. In fact the coe¢cient is large at between 8-13% which
cancels out the e¤ect of layo¤. Notably, there is some evidence that the insurance role of
34Repeating the analysis on the sample from Table 3 yields the same conclusions.
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FMLA is mediated by food stamps, as the interaction coe¢cient is slightly smaller in the rst
column (which includes food stamps) than in the second column of results. Taken together,
the nding of consumption smoothing against the paternal shock for mothers covered by
unpaid maternity leave provides further evidence of the insurance role of unpaid maternity
leave.35
7 Placebo Tests
7.1 Mothers Working Part-Time in the Year Before Birth.
As mentioned in Section 2, an eligibility criteria for unpaid leave was the accrual of 1250
hours of work in the 12 months leading up to the birth. We would expect no interaction
e¤ect of FMLA with the paternal layo¤ for mothers working fewer hours, which makes for
an interesting placebo test.
Hours worked is available annually rather than monthly and we run a placebo test by
repeating analysis of Table 3 on the sample of mothers working less than 1250 hours in the
year before birth. For space considerations, the placebo tests in Table 8 report only the
marginal e¤ect of the interaction between FMLA and layo¤ on the conditional probability
of observing the mother in each of the three states (work, home and fertility). Panel 1 dis-
tinguishes between part-and full- time work in the year before birth, with panel 1a reporting
the placebo e¤ects for ineligible mothers working less than 1250 hours and panel 1b for the
mothers working at least 1250 hours. Panel 1a shows no signicant di¤erence in the marginal
e¤ect of paternal layo¤ by FMLA status. Moreover the estimate is statistically di¤erent to
the estimate in Table 3.36 Hence we nd no e¤ect on the placebo group of ineligible mothers.
For eligible mothers in panel 1b the di¤erence increases to 3.6 percentage points (63.13%)
but again becomes insignicant. In this case, there is no statistical di¤erence between the
estimate in panel 1b and Table 3.37
35Similar conclusions are drawn from regressions restricting the sample years as in the main analysis.
The coe¢cient (standard errors) for β
3
are 0.076(0.037), 0.080(0.044).0.068(0.049) for column 1, 2 and 3
respectively.
36The t-statistic for the test of equality of coe¢cients is 2.89.
37The t-statistic is 0.17.
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7.2 Setting a Randomly Chosen Implementation date for FMLA
We may worry that the insurance e¤ect of FMLA estimated in Table 3 is biased and picking
up other unobservable attributes of treated areas and treated mothers. To investigate this, a
placebo experiment creates six articial dates for the implementation of FMLA up to one year
before the federal policy change in August 1993. We exclude the six months immediately
before the policy change as many of the mothers with placebo treatment status equal to
one are also treated in reality. If we have correctly specied the model, we should nd no
signicant insurance e¤ect from FMLA implemented at these false policy implementation
date.
What is reported in panel 2 of Table 8 is the di¤erence in the marginal e¤ect of layo¤
by eligibility for unpaid maternity leave. The table shows that in all cases the coe¢cients
are statistically insignicantly di¤erent to zero and the magnitude of estimates are lower
than in our main regression. Furthermore in almost all cases the coe¢cients from columns 1
and 2 are statistically di¤erent to the respective columns in Table 3  suggesting that whilst
the real policy led to an insurance e¤ect, the placebo policies did not. Note that in column
3 of the placebo test table, some coe¢cients are not statistically di¤erent to column 3 of
table 3, if in both cases the marginal e¤ects are insignicantly di¤erent to zero. Where the
coe¢cients are signicant in the main paper, they are statistically di¤erent to those in the
placebo tests.38
8 Conclusion
If there were complete markets, households would fully insure themselves against shocks
to employment. This paper has shown that with maternity leave restrictions mothers are
less able to e¤ectively use their labour supply to smooth shocks to paternal employment.
In particular, in the absence of employment protection during maternity, the conditional
probability of a mother returning to work in response to a paternal employment shock is
49.08% or 2.7 percentage points lower than for mothers eligible for the unpaid maternity
38Selecting di¤erent false implementation dates led to similar results, for example 6 months and 1 year
before and after August 1993. Results are available from the author on request.
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leave. The insurance role of unpaid maternity leave was supported by additional ndings
which suggested that in the 5 states which o¤ered paid maternity leave, the female labour
supply response to a layo¤ was smaller than for mothers with unpaid leave, and statistically
insignicant and by evidence that the negative e¤ect of a paternal layo¤ on household food
consumption was smoothed out for mothers covered by maternity leave. Whilst to date a
large literature has evaluated the benets of unpaid maternity leave in terms of maternal
and child outcomes, this is the rst paper to add a third benet of the insurance role.
To give the e¤ect some magnitude, the mean local employment rate of females in the
sample was 62% and the standard deviation 1%, suggesting we estimate large shifts into
work. Figure 1b showed the female participation rate to drop from 70% pre-pregnancy
to around 55% thereafter, a change of 15 percentage points. So the additional insurance
response of female labour supply to a paternal shock in areas which protect employment for
a spell around childbirth is 20% the size of this change. It seems that given the opportunity,
households are keen to take advantage of the ability to self-insure against shocks.
If households are not adequately able to insure themselves there will be welfare conse-
quences both to the adults in the household in terms of consumption but also to the children.
Children living in households that experience negative shocks tend to accumulate lower levels
of education, have lower earnings are more likely to drop out from high school (Carneiro et
al. 2015b). However, whilst it is positive that the unpaid maternity leave improved insurance
possibilities for families, a speed up of the return to work within the rst 12 weeks of birth
could be harmful for the child. Of the vast literature on the e¤ects of maternal labour sup-
ply upon child human capital outcomes39, only a small number of papers focus on mothers
returning to work within the rst 12 weeks of life. Berger et al. (2005) nd a speed up of
the return to work by mothers after childbirth to be associated with a lower incidence of
breast-feeding and immunization, and a higher prevalence of child externalizing behavioural
problems. Baum (2003a) found that the increase in income associated with a mother work-
ing within the rst 3 months did not fully o¤set the negative e¤ect on vocabulary scores.
Interestingly, among the sample of mothers who did eventually return to work, Baum found
a negative e¤ect of hours worked in the rst quarter, suggesting that if mothers were able
39see Blau and Currie (2003) for a review
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to take more time o¤ after childbirth, it would result in an improvement in child outcomes.
Finally, Carneiro et al. (2015a) found that a policy in Norway to extend maternity leave
from 12 weeks of unpaid to 4 months of paid leave raised time that mothers spent with their
children and improved long-term human capital outcomes for the children. Brooks-Gunn et
al. (2002) however found an insignicant e¤ect of mothers returning to work by the third
month on cognitive ability measures. The general conclusion of these papers indicate that
early return to work is harmful to children. Combining with the nding of a statistically
insignicant e¤ect of paid maternity leave on the timing of return to work, the evidence
suggests that, an extension of the FMLA to o¤er paid maternity leave may protect not just
income levels but also child human capital against household shocks.
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Figure 2: First Re-Entry to the labour Market.
Sample includes last births. Hazard rate calculated as # spells ending during t / # spells not
ended in t-1.
Table 1: Sample Statistics
Variable Sample Mean
Standard
Deviation
Paternal Monthly Layoff 30664 0.079 0.269
Paternal Layoff during first 3 Months of Birth 6,346 0.089 0.284
Maternity Leave Legislation Indicator 30664 0.280 0.449
FMLA Eligibility Indicator 30664 0.068 0.251
Previous Layoff Indicator 30664 0.156 0.363
Maternal Work During-Pregnancy Indicator 30664 0.410 0.492
Father Degree Status 30664 0.235 0.424
Mother Degree Status 30664 0.183 0.387
Father Age 30664 33.156 6.881
Mother Age 30664 30.299 5.861
Local Education-Specific Female Employment Rate 30664 0.605 0.096
Family Size 30664 3.059 1.649
Age return to work 12807 26.06 22.81
Age mother has next child 5181 32.24 17.30
Age of final observation if censored 12676 57.68 29.54
Local education specic female employment rate matches the state specic female employment
rate by education categories no qualications, high school or degree +.
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Table 2: Duration Statistics: Monthly Maternal State
State Sample Proportion
a) Destination for each Child
Work 1,703 72.78
Censored 407 17.39
Fertility 230 9.83
Total 2,340 100
b) In a particular month
At home with Child 28731 93.70
Work 1703 5.55
Fertility 230 0.75
Total 30664 100
Table 3: Competing Risk Estimation of Labour Market Entry by Maternity Leave Policy
(1) (2) (3)
Return to
Work
At  Home
with Child
Further
Fertility
Layoff 0.005 -0.005 0.001
(0.006) (0.006) (0.002)
RME 8.77% -0.57% 6.74%
FMLA 0.056*** -0.058*** 0.003
(0.006) (0.008) (0.003)
RME 101.60% -6.22% 36.17%
Layoff * FMLA
1 0.027** -0.036*** 0.009
(0.012) (0.015) (0.007)
RME 49.08% -3.85% 123.18%
N=30664
Marginal e¤ects reported. 1 Di¤erence in e¤ect of paternal shock by FMLA eligibility
dened in equation (6). FMLA = 0 if no maternity coverage or maternity
coverage but mother did not work pre-pregnancy or child no older than eligibility criteria.
Controls include paternal and maternal age and education, maternal year of birth, family
size, ethnicity, previous paternal layo¤, maternal working pre-pregnancy and state
education-specic female employment rate, child year of birth dummies. RME is relative
marginal e¤ect: relative to probability of being in state for average individual with layo¤=0.
Standard errors clustered by state and computed by Delta method. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 4: Distinguishing between Part-Time and Full-Time Status
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Return to
PT Work
Return to
FT Work
At  Home
with Child
Further
Fertility
Layoff 0.001 0.004 -0.005 0.000
(0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.002)
RME 2.81% 14.18% -0.52% 6.23%
FMLA 0.026*** 0.028*** -0.059*** 0.004
(0.004) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003)
RME 89.85% 109.35% -6.30% 58.90%
Layoff * FMLA
1
0.014 0.012* -0.035*** 0.009
(0.010) (0.007) (0.014) (0.006)
RME 48.19% 45.51% -3.72% 121.48%
N=30664
Table 5: Selecting Households with No Previous Layo¤ Status of Father
(1) (2) (3)
Return to Work
At  Home with
Child Further Fertility
Layoff 0.005 -0.005 0.001
(0.006) (0.006) (0.002)
RME 8.56% -0.56% 6.72%
FMLA 0.055*** -0.058*** 0.003
(0.006) (0.005) (0.003)
RME 100.49% -6.18% 36.20%
Layoff * FMLA
1 0.032* -0.042* 0.010
(0.018) (0.022) (0.009)
RME 58.28% -4.47% 131.35%
N=25869
Marginal e¤ects reported. 1 Di¤erence in e¤ect of paternal shock by FMLA eligibility dened
in equation (6). Controls same as Table 3. RME is relative marginal e¤ect relative
to probability of being in state for average individual with layo¤=0. FMLA = 0 if no maternity coverage
or maternity coverage but mother did not work pre-pregnancy or child no older than eligibility criteria.
Standard errors clustered by state and computed by Delta method. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 6: Paid Maternity Leave Through Temporary Disability Insurance
(1) (2) (3)
Return to Work At  Home with Child Further Fertility
Layoff 0.004 -0.004 0.001
(0.006) (0.006) (0.002)
RME 6.83% -0.46% 8.32%
TDI 0.030*** -0.031*** -0.002
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
55.09% -3.62% -32.01%
Layoff * TDI
1 0.005 0.071*** -0.077***
(0.013) (0.017) (0.007)
RME 10.03% 7.61% 1026.97%
N=29587
Table 7: Insurance of Food Consumption
(1) (2) (3)
Log Food
Consumption
(total)
Log Food Consumption
(excluding Food
Stamps)
Log Food
Consumption
(within house only)
Layoff -0.037** -0.055** -0.055**
(0.017) (0.023) (0.022)
FMLA 0.004 0.000 -0.006
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
Layoff * FMLA 0.081* 0.109** 0.127***
(0.041) (0.046) (0.042)
N 68,554 68,554 68,554
Marginal e¤ects reported. 1 Di¤erence in e¤ect of paternal shock by FMLA and TDI eligibility dened
in equation (6). Controls same as Table 3. RME is relative marginal
e¤ect relative to probability of being in state for average individual with layo¤=0. TDI=1 in TDI states
for child no older than 2 months and 0 otherwise. FMLA = 0 if no maternity coverage or maternity
coverage but mother did not work pre-pregnancy or child no older than eligibility criteria.
Standard errors clustered by state and computed by Delta method. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 8: Placebo Tests
The marginal e¤ect of paternal employment shock
(1) (2) (3)
Return to Work
At Home with
Child
Further Fertility
1) Heterogeneity by hours worked in year before birth
a) Worked less than 1250 hours in year before birth
Layoff * FMLA 0.007 0.065*** -0.073***
(0.015) (0.016) (0.009)
RME 12.17% 6.63% 968.88%
b) Worked at least 1250 hours in year before birth
Layoff * FMLA 0.036 0.089 -0.125***
(0.056) (0.062) (0.015)
RME 63.13% 9.47% 1753.38%
N=28030
2) Setting false policy implementation dates
a) August 1992 0.015 -0.022 0.007
(0.015) (0.017) (0.006)
t-statistic for test of same
coefficient 2.052 -2.253 1.818
b) September 1992 0.018 -0.026 0.007
(0.015) (0.018) (0.006)
t-statistic for test of same
coefficient 1.539 -5.263 1.818
c) October 1992 0.022 -0.030 0.009
(0.016) (0.019) (0.006)
t-statistic for test of same
coefficient 2.791 1.038 0.000
d) November 1992  [9] 0.019 -0.027 0.008
(0.016) (0.019) (0.006)
t-statistic for test of same
coefficient 4.465 1.558 0.909
e) December 1992 0.019 -0.027 0.008
(0.016) (0.018) (0.006)
t-statistic for test of same
coefficient 4.465 -4.737 0.909
f) January 1993  [5] 0.019 -0.027 0.008
(0.016) (0.019) (0.006)
t-statistic for test of same
coefficient 4.465 1.558 0.909
N==30664
1 Di¤erence in e¤ect of paternal shock by FMLA eligibility dened in equation (6).
Controls identical to Table 3. Standard errors clustered by state and computed by
Delta method. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.35
9 Appendix
Appendix Table 1: States Early to Implement Unpaid Maternity Leave
State Date
Implementation
Period of
Eligibility
California January 1992 6 months
Connecticut July 1990 16 weeks
District of Columbia April 1991 12 weeks
Maine April 1988 12 weeks
Massachusetts October 1972 12 weeks
Minnesota July 1987 6 weeks
New Jersey April 1990 12 weeks
Oregon January 1988 12 weeks
Rhode Island July 1987 13 weeks
Tennessee January 1988 4 months
Vermont July 1992 12 weeks
Washington September 1989 12 weeks
Wisconsin April 1988 6 weeks
Details for states which implemented unpaid maternity leave prior to 1993.
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